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Abstract
Our goal in this paper is two-fold. First, we develop a class of term structure
models that allow for the role of bounded rationality by incorporating either
information-processing constraint or fear for mis-specification into affine term
structure models. We indentify a set of sufficient conditions to generate the ob-
servational equivalence between affine term-structure models with rational inat-
tention and a fear for model misspecification. The presence of bounded rationality
creates a new additional factor that is not spanned by conventional factors such
as level, slope, and curvature factors. Second, our empirical results indicate that
substantial amounts of information capacity constraint and robustness preference
for model misspecification are needed to explain the observed behavior of yields.
JEL classification: E43; E44; G11; G12
Keywords: Rational Inattention; Robustness; Affine Term Structure Models; No-Arbitrage
E-mail address: tackyun@snu.ac.kr. We appreciate helpful and valuable comments from participants of
seminars at Hong Kong University, Seoul National University, Yonsei University, and the Joint Annual
Conference of Korean and Korean-American Economic Associations. Tack Yun has been supported by SNU
Institute for Research in Finance and Economics.
1 Introduction
In many recent works on macroeconomics and finance, researchers have emphasized the im-
portance of informational frictions such as rational inattention and a preference for robust-
ness to model mis-specification in understanding the actual behavior of key macroeconomic
variables and financial indicators. In addition, macro-finance affine term-structure models
have drawn a lot of attention from academic researchers and policy makers. In this paper,
we combine affine term-structure models with recent works on rational inattention and a
preference for robustness to model mis-specification, which can be used to understand the
role of rational inattention or fear for model misspecification in actual data on yields and
macroeconomic variables.
Our goal in this paper is two-fold. First, we develop a class of affine term structure models
that allow for the role of bounded rationality by incorporating either information-processing
constraint or fear for mis-specification into an otherwise canonical representation of the three-
factor arbitrage-free affine model. We indentify a set of sufficient conditions to generate the
observational equivalence between affine term-structure models with rational inattention
and a fear for model misspecification. For each of these models, the presence of bounded
rationality creates a new additional factor that is not spanned by conventional factors such
as level, slope, and curvature factors.1 Second, we explore the possibility that macro-finance
affine models with such a bounded rationality factor help estimate the magnitude of rational
inattention or fear for model misspecification.
We begin with a future-state information-tracking problem associated with the stochastic
discount factor. Our characterization of information processing problems builds on the work
of Sims (2011). We also incorporate the risk-sensitive approach of Hansen and Sargent (2011)
into the identification of the unknown stochastic discount factor in an otherwise canonical
affine term-structure model. As mentioned above, each of risk-sensitive and rational inat-
tention approaches generates a new additional factor respectively, which is called a bounded
rationality factor in our paper.
In particular, although these models have different rules governing intertemporal move-
ments of their bounded rationality factors, the two models are observationally equivalent
in terms of deflated bond prices (deflated by bounded rationality factors) when the affine
structure is maintained. We thus exploit this equivalence result in order to construct an
empirical measure of bounded rationality factors.
1It has been emphasized in the literature that conventional three factors such as level, slope, and curvature
factors help understand the observed behavior of the yield curve, as shown in Litterman and Scheinkman
(1991), Dai and Singleton (2000), Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and so on.
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Specifically, we adopt a two-step approach to estimate the degree of rational inattention
and size of multiplier in the risk-sensitive approach. First, we construct an empirical measure
of bounded rationality factors. Second, each model’s law of motion for its bounded ratio-
nality factor is then used to estimate the magnitude of rational inattention or the degree of
fear for model mis-specification. Our empirical results indicate that substantial amounts of
information capacity constraint and robustness for model misspecification are needed to ex-
plain the observed behavior of yields when we use affine term-structure models. In addition,
out-of-sample forecasts of our models indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality
can enhance an affine term-structure model’s capability to forecast yields.
The empirical performance of our approach can be also evaluated in terms of the role
of bounded rationality factors to help explain excess returns of bond holdings. A set of
recent papers have emphasized the importance of additional factors in understanding the
observed behavior of excess returns. For example, Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) find that
lagged forward rates contain information about future excess bond returns that is not in
current forward rates. Duffee (2011) also argues the importance of a “hidden” factor in
understanding the behavior of excess returns of long-term bonds.2
A plausible source of hidden factors suggested by Duffee is the news that raises risk premia
and simultaneously leads investors to believe the Fed will soon cut short-term interest rates.
In this case, the increase in risk premia induces an immediate increase in long-term bond
yields, while the expected drop in short rates induces an immediate decrease in these yields.
Our analysis suggests one more source for hidden factors: Inability to observe some current
state variables that do not have direct influence on short-term interest rates but affect the
market price of risk.
In particular, we present a couple of sufficient conditions for the inattention factors to be
identical to the hidden factors. First, some factors that do not directly affect the short-term
interest rate are subject to information-processing constraint under equivalent probability
measures. Second, the market price of risk should respond to these inattention factors. This
feature is in contrast with the case of rational inattention on future states. Once these two
sufficient conditions are satisfied, the presence of rational inattention helps generate the linear
structure of factor dynamics that is the same as the one used in Duffee, while it leads to a set
of cross-equation restrictions on the parameters associated with inter-temporal movements
of hidden factors.
2Recent affine term structure models with additional factors include Duffee (2002) and Joslin, Priebsch,
and Singleton (2010), while Svensson (1995), Christensen, Diebold, and Rudebusch (2009) and many other
researchers also have employed modified Nelson-Siegel models with additional factors.
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Our framework might provide a different channel through which the inattention factor
can create the identical effect of the hidden factor on yield curves and excess returns. Let
us suppose that the central bank is not subject to any rational inattention constraint in
observing factors when the central bank determines the short-term nominal interest rate,
whereas financial-market participants are subject to a rational inattention constraint for one
of the level, slope, and curvature factors. In this case, a shock to the information set of
agents does not move the current time-t yield curve but affect the equilibrium dynamics of
yields and thus expected excess returns of holding bonds.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 present affine term structure models when a
rational inattention constraint is imposed on the stochastic discount factor. In section 3, we
discuss the implication of risk-sensitive approach for affine term structure models. In section
4, we exploit the observational equivalence result on bounded rationality factors when we
estimate models. Section 5 contains our results on affine term structure models with rational
inattention for current states. Section 6 concludes.
2 An Affine Term Structure Model with Rational Inat-
tention on the Stochastic Discount Factor
Our main goal of this section is to present an affine term-structure model when a rational
inattention constraint is imposed on the stochastic discount factor. We also discuss the case
in which there is a signal extraction problem in the identification of the stochastic discount
factor. The reason why we do this is that these two models produce comparable specifications
of the stochastic discount factor.
Definition 2.1 (Target stochastic discount factor) The history of states at period t
is represented by st = (s0, · · · , st) and the state at period t + 1 is denoted by st+1. The
transition probability between periods t and t + 1 is represented by pi(st, st+1). The target
stochastic discount factor m(st, st+1) is defined as the one that would have been effective
under the assumption of rational expectations.
The beliefs of agents are represented by the joint distribution of their perceived stochastic
discount factor and the target stochastic discount factor which is defined as the one that
would have been effective when the rational-expectations hypothesis holds. The construction
of their beliefs is constrained by an upper bound on the relative entropy between the joint
distribution and the product distribution of the two stochastic discount factors. This upper-
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bound reflects the presence of capacity-constraint in processing the information regarding
the target stochastic discount factor.
Assumption 2.1 (Imperfect information about the stochastic discount factor) In
the presence of the information-processing constraint, agents do not have perfect knowledge
about the realized value at period t+1 of the logarithm of the target stochastic discount factor
m(st, st+1) given a state at period t. In addition, agents do not observe the realized value at
period t of the (log) target stochastic discount factor m(st−1, st) given a state at period t− 1.
Given the first statement of Assumption 2.1, we will assume that agents choose a joint
distribution of the target and perceived stochastic discount factors by minimizing their mean
squared errors given the information-processing constraint. The second statement guarantees
that agents cannot learn the true distribution of the target stochastic discount factor by
observing realized values of the target stochastic discount factor over time.
In light of the first statement of Assumption 2.1, a constrained optimization problem
for beliefs regarding the stochastic discount factor can be formulated as follows. In this
optimization problem, m is the (log) target stochastic discount factor and mˆ is the actual
(log) stochastic discount factor that are used by participants of financial markets. Following
Sims (2011), agents choose a joint distribution to minimize the mean squared errors subject
to an information-processing constraint.
max
ft(m,mˆ)
−
∫ ∫
ft(m, mˆ)(m− mˆ)
2dm dmˆ (2.1)
subject to ∫ ∫
ft(m, mˆ) log
ft(m, mˆ)
gt(m)ht(mˆ)
dm dmˆ ≤ κ (2.2)
where gt(m) and ht(mˆ) are defined as
gt(m) =
∫
ft(m, mˆ)dmˆ, ht(mˆ) =
∫
ft(m, mˆ)dm. (2.3)
We will present an application of Sims’s problem specified above.3 In particular, we
assume that both m and mˆ are normal random variables. In this case, when agents observe
a noisy signal (for m) z = m + ν and the noise ν are a normal variable with means zero
and its standard deviation σν , the optimal forecast of m, defined as mˆ = E[m|z], is given
3The solution of this non-linear optimization problem implies that the joint density function of m and
mˆ is affected by the Lagrange multiplier associated with information-processing constraint (denoted by θ):
ft(m, mˆ) = gt(m)ht(mˆ) exp(−
1
θ
(m− mˆ)2)/
∫
ht(mˆ) exp(−
1
θ
(m− mˆ)2)dmˆ.
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by mˆ = τz where τ = σ2m/(σ
2
m + σ
2
ν) and σ
2
m is the variance of m. The mutual information
between m and mˆ is given by I(m, mˆ) = - (1/2) log(1− ρ2m,mˆ) where ρ
2
m,mˆ is the correlation
coefficient between m and mˆ.4 Hence, the information-processing constraint can be written
as
−
1
2
log(1− τ) ≤ κ (2.4)
where κ is the upper bound on the capacity of processing information. Given that mˆ =
τ(m+ ν) and E[mν] = 0, the mean squared error of m is E[(m− mˆ)2] = (1− τ)2σ2m + τ
2σ2ν .
The rational inattention problem turns out to be
min
τ
{(1− τ)2σ2m + τ
2σ2ν + λ(4κ+ 2 log(1− τ))} (2.5)
Definition 2.2 (Characterization of rational inattention problem) Under the as-
sumption that both m and mˆ are normal random variables, the rational inattention problem
can be defined as
min
τ
{(1− τ)2σ2m + τ
2σ2ν + λ(4κ+ 2 log(1− τ))} (2.6)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the information processing constraint.
The first-order condition to this minimization problem is
λ = (1− τ)(τσ2ν − (1− τ)σ
2
m). (2.7)
As a result, when the information constraint is binding, the Lagrange multiplier λ is deter-
mined by the upper bound on the information-processing constraint:
λ = exp(−2κ)((1− exp(−2κ))σ2ν − exp(−2κ)σ
2
m). (2.8)
Assumption 2.2 (Uniqueness of the target stochastic discount factor) When the
transition distribution of the state vector between periods t and t+1 is denoted by pi(st, st+1),
this transition distribution is not affected by the presence of rational inattention. In addition,
the logarithm of the target stochastic discount factor m(st, st+1) exists uniquely for each pair
of states (st, st+1).
4The mutual information measures the amount of information updated in each period. The entropy of a
normal n× 1 random vector (denoted by f) is H(f) = 1
2
log((2pie)n|K|) where K is the covariance matrix.
The mutual information measures the reduction of uncertainty of X due to the knowledge of Y : I(X,Y ) =
h(X) - h(X |Y ) where h(X) is computed at period t− 1 information set and h(X |Y ) is computed at period t
information set. h(X |Y ) = 1
2
log((2pie)n|Σt|) and h(X) =
1
2
log((2pie)n|Mt|). Hence, the mutual information
is I(X,Y ) = 1
2
(log(|Σt|)− log(|Mt|)).
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The uniqueness of the target stochastic discount factor leads to a one-to- one correspon-
dence between a future state st+1 and the actual stochastic discount factor that holds for
agents who are subject to the rational inattention constraint for future states. Hence, this
one-to-one correspondence allows us to compute expected present-values of future payoffs by
using the actual stochastic discount factor, given the assumption that agents know the true
distribution of states in each period. Given these assumptions, no-arbitrage condition in the
presence of rational inattention implies that the price at period t of a n-period bond (= Pˆn,t)
is
Pˆn,t(st) =
∫
E[exp(mˆt,t+1)|mt,t+1(st+1)]Pˆn−1,t+1(st+1)dpi(st, st+1) (2.9)
where mˆt,t+1 = mˆ(s
t, st+1) and mt,t+1(st+1) = m(s
t, st+1). In the absence of rational inatten-
tion, the price at period t of a n- period bond (denoted by Pn,t) is
Pn,t(st) =
∫
Mt,t+1(st+1)Pn−1,t+1(st+1)dpi(st, st+1) (2.10)
where Mt,t+1(st+1) = exp(mt,t+1(st+1)).
Proposition 2.1 (Characterization of the stochastic discount factor under a sig-
nal extraction problem) Suppose that assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. The stochastic dis-
count factor is then given by E[exp(mˆt,t+1)|mt,t+1] = exp(τtmt,t+1 + τ
2
t σ
2
v/2), where τt =
σt(mt,t+1)
2/(σt(mt,t+1)
2 + σ2ν). The size of σ
2
v is constant and exogenously determined.
In order to show that this proposition holds, we will use a version of signal extraction
problem that permits the derivation of the functional form of the actual stochastic discount
factor. Let us suppose that agents expect to observe a random variable z, while z can
be interpreted as a noisy signal for the target stochastic discount factor: z = m + ν. In
this case, mˆ is the optimal forecast of m given the noisy signal, so that mˆ = E[m|z]. The
solution to this signal extraction problem leads to E[m|z] = τz and τ = σ2m/(σ
2
m + σ
2
ν). The
main difference from rational inattention is that the size of σ2ν is exogenously determined
in the model with signal extraction. Given that mˆ follows a normal distribution, we have
E[exp(mˆ)|m] = exp(τm + τ 2σ2v/2) where τ = σ
2
m/(σ
2
m + σ
2
ν). In sum, the actual stochastic
discount factor between periods t and t+ 1 can be written as
E[exp(mˆt,t+1)|mt,t+1(st+1)] = exp(τtmt,t+1(st+1) +
τ 2t σ
2
v
2
). (2.11)
The logarithm of the actual stochastic discount factor is thus given by
m˜t,t+1 = τtmt,t+1(st+1) +
τ 2t σ
2
v
2
. (2.12)
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The logarithm of the actual stochastic discount factor is conditionally affine in terms of the
logarithm of the stochastic discount factor that would have been effective when rational-
expectations hypothesis holds. The addition of a term such as τ 2t σ
2
v/2 reflects the fact that
the stochastic discount factor is a log-normal random variable.
Proposition 2.2 (Characterization of the stochastic discount factor under ratio-
nal inattention) Suppose that agents solve the rational inattention problem specified in
definition 2.2. The resulting stochastic discount factor is given by E[exp(mˆt,t+1)|mt,t+1] =
exp(τmt,t+1 + τ
2σ2v/2). Moreover, we should solve τ = σt(mt,t+1)
2/(σt(mt,t+1)
2 + σ2ν,t) and
τ = 1 - exp(−2κ) at the same time. As a result, σ2ν,t varies over time and is endogenously
determined.
The solution to our rational inattention problem (defined in definition 2.2) implies that
τ = 1 − exp(−2κ). It is important to note that τ is constant over time in the presence
of rational inattention. Therefore, we have σ2ν,t = σt(mt,t+1)
2 exp(−2κ)/(1 − exp(−2κ)).
As a result, the difference between rational inattention and signal extraction is reflected in
whether the variance of noises is constant or time-varying.
Proposition 2.3 (Market price of risk) Suppose that assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 hold. The
market price of risk under rational inattention is
σt(Mˆt,t+1)
Et[Mˆt,t+1]
=
√
exp(τ 2t σt(Mt,t+1)
2)− 1 (2.13)
where Mˆt,t+1 is the stochastic discount factor under rational inattention and Mt,t+1 is the
target stochastic discount factor. In particular, we have τt = 1 - exp(−2κ) in the case of
rational inattention and τt = σt(mt,t+1)
2/(σt(mt,t+1)
2 + σ2ν) in the case of signal extraction.
We move onto the impact of rational inattention on the market price of risk. The market
price of risk is defined as the ratio of the standard deviation of the stochastic discount factor
(conditional on current-period’s information) to its conditional expectation. The market
price of risk is σt(Mt,t+1)/Et[Mt,t+1] in the absence of any informational friction. In order to
see the impact of rational inattention on the market price of risk, we compare the market
price of risk under rational inattention with the one under rational expectations:
σt(Mˆt,t+1)
Et[Mˆt,t+1]
=
σt(M
τt
t,t+1)
Et[M
τt
t,t+1]
(2.14)
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where Mˆt,t+1 = E[exp(mˆt,t+1)|mt,t+1]. Under the assumption of conditional log-normality,
the market price of risk under rational expectations is
σt(Mt,t+1)
Et[Mt,t+1]
=
√
exp(σt(Mt,t+1)2)− 1 (2.15)
while the market price of risk under rational inattention is
σt(Mˆt,t+1)
Et[Mˆt,t+1]
=
√
exp(τ 2t σt(Mt,t+1)
2)− 1. (2.16)
An implication of this equation is that the market price of risk is decreased with the
introduction of rational inattention when τt (> 0) is less than one. The key reason why we
have this result is that even in the presence of rational inattention, the stochastic discount
factor depends only on true states, which means that expectation errors of agents due to
rational inattention are not reflected in the pricing kernel of assets. Hence, we implicitly
assume that the pricing kernel does not depend on man-made artificial uncertainties even
when agents are subject to rational inattention. In this case, the logarithm of the stochastic
discount factor under rational inattention is proportional to that under rational expectations
while the proportionality constant is less than one reflecting the presence of information
processing constraint. As a result, the market price of risk is decreased with the introduction
of rational inattention as shown above.
We will see whether or not the introduction of rational inattention increases the number
of factors that affect yields and prices of pure discount bonds. In order to see this, we will
assume that under rational expectations, a standard affine term-structure model holds.
Assumption 2.3 (Specification of the target stochastic discount factor) Suppose
that under rational expectations, a standard affine term-structure model holds. In this model,
the target stochastic discount factor is specified as
Mt,t+1 = exp(−rt −
1
2
λ′tλt − λ
′
tt+1), (2.17)
while the dynamics of factors (denoted by Xt) are described by the following equation:
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + Σt. (2.18)
An implication of assumption 2.3 is that the market price of risk is not affected by the
presence of rational inattention. In fact, we need this assumption regarding the price of risk,
in order to maintain the affine structure of the model in the presence of rational inattention.
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Proposition 2.4 (Characterization of belief factor) Suppose that assumptions 2.1 - 2.3
hold. The bounded rationality factor in affine term-structure models with rational inattention
for the stochastic discount factor evolves over time according to the following equation:
ψt+1 = ψt − (1− τt)mt,t+1 + τ
2
t σ
2
v/2. (2.19)
where τt = 1 - exp(−2κ) in the case of rational inattention and τt = σt(mt,t+1)2/(σt(mt,t+1)2+
σ2ν) in the case of signal extraction.
In order to show that this proposition holds, we impose no-arbitrage condition for prices of
bonds that are traded by agents who are subject to rational inattention or a signal extraction
problem. Specifically, no-arbitrage conditions for bond prices can be rewritten as follows:
P˜n,t = Et[Mt,t+1P˜n−1,t+1] P˜n,t = ΨtPˆn,t (2.20)
where P˜n,t denotes a deflated bond price of Pˆn,t under rational inattention (deflated by Ψt)
and the evolution of Ψt can be described by the following equation:
Ψt+1 = Ψt exp(−(1− τt)mt,t+1 + τ
2
t σ
2
v/2). (2.21)
We also emphasize that this Euler equation for bond prices is the same as the one that
would have been effective under rational expectations. We thus see that the affine structure of
logarithms of bond prices and yields holds for the set of bond prices in each period denoted by
{P˜n,t}Tn=0. Given these two assumptions, logarithms of bond prices under rational inattention
and signal extraction are linear functions of state variables:
pˆn,t = a¯n + b¯
′
nXt − ψt, (2.22)
where a¯n and b¯n are determined by the following difference equations:
b¯′n+1 = b¯
′
n(φ− Σλ1) + b¯
′
1, a¯n+1 = a¯n + b¯
′
n(c− Σλ0) +
1
2
b¯′nΣΣ
′b¯n + a¯1 (2.23)
for n = 1, 2, · · · , T.
In particular, the bounded rationality factor is conditionally linear in terms of shocks to
state variables:
ψt+1 = ψt − (1− τt)mt,t+1 + τ
2
t σ
2
v/2. (2.24)
It follows from this equation that ψt+1 = ψt when τt = 1 and σ
2
v = 0 that means the absence of
any constraint on information-processing capacity. In this case, bond prices become identical
to those under the assumption of rational expectations.
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Proposition 2.5 (Impact of the inattention belief factor on excess returns) The
market price of risk in period t is given by
λt = λ0 + λ1Xt. (2.25)
Suppose that assumptions 2.1 - 2.3 hold. The logarithm of the excess return from holding
bonds with maturity n between periods t and t + 1 is defined as rx
(n)
t,t+1 = pˆn−1,t+1 - pˆn,t +
pˆ1,t. The logarithm of excess return can be written as
rx
(n)
t,t+1 = b¯
′
n−1Σ(λ0 + λ1Xt)−
1
2
b¯′nΣΣ
′b¯n + b¯
′
n−1Σt+1 − ψt+1 (2.26)
where c = 0.
The key message of this proposition is that the presence of rational inattention for future
states forces excess returns of holding bonds to be influenced by the inattention belief factor
on top of conventional factors.
3 An Affine Term Structure Model with Risk-Sensitive
Approach
We will discuss the difference between risk-sensitive and rational inattention approaches in
terms of affine term-structure models. In this section, we still assume that, although agents
do not know the true stochastic discount factor, they have a set of probability evaluations
about their approximating models for the stochastic discount factor. In this regard, we
take the risk-sensitive approach developed in Hansen and Sargent (2011), while the following
assumption is still needed for the existence of conditional expectations of agents.
Assumption 3.1 (Uniqueness of the target stochastic discount factor) When the
transition distribution of the state vector between periods t and t+1 is denoted by pi(st, st+1),
this transition distribution is not affected by the presence of rational inattention. In addi-
tion, the target stochastic discount factor M(st, st+1) exists uniquely for each pair of states
(st, st+1).
Proposition 3.1 (Characterization of the stochastic discount factor) Suppose that
assumption 3.1 holds. We also assume that agents have fear for the possibility of misspeci-
fying their approximating model as in the framework of Hansen and Sargent (2011). Specifi-
cally, agents choose a probability distribution of their approximating model (for the stochastic
discount factor) by solving the following problem:
min
Kt,t+1(st+1)≥0
∫
Kt,t+1(st+1)[Mt,t+1(st+1) + θ logKt,t+1(st+1)]pi(st, st+1)dst+1 (3.1)
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subject to ∫
Kt,t+1(st+1)pi(st, st+1)dst+1 = 1. (3.2)
The solution to this problem for Kt,t+1(st+1) is given by
Kt,t+1(st+1) =
exp(−Mt,t+1(st+1)/θ)∫
exp(−Mt,t+1(st+1)/θ)pi(st, st+1)dst+1
. (3.3)
Our proposition is an direct application of the work of Hansen-Sargent (2011) for the
risk-sensitive operator that is applied to a (value) function V (x) of a random vector x with
density f(x). In their model, the risk-sensitivity operator is defined in terms of the indirect
utility function T [V ] that emerges from:
T [V ] = min
K(x)≥0
∫
K(x)[V (x) + θ logK(x)]f(x)dx (3.4)
subject to ∫
K(x)f(x)dx = 1. (3.5)
The solution to this problem for K(x) is given by
K(x) =
exp(−V (x)/θ)∫
exp(−V (x)/θ)f(x)dx
. (3.6)
At this point, it is worthwhile to discuss the interpretation of θ. In order to do this,
we assume that the data are actually generated by a nearby model of an approximating
model denoted by pˆi(st, st+1), while pi(st, st+1) is an approximating model for the conditional
distribution of future states. In addition, there is an upper bound on the conditional relative
entropy between these two distributions:
It(pi, pˆi) =
∫
pˆi(st, st+1) log
pˆi(st, st+1)
pi(st, st+1)
dst+1 ≥ η
A Lagrangian of the minimization problem for the belief distortion is then given by
min
Kt,t+1(st+1)≥0
∫
Kt,t+1(st+1)Mt,t+1(st+1)pi(st, st+1)dst+1 + θ(It(pi, pˆi)− η)
where θ is the Lagrange multiplier and Kt,t+1(st+1) is the conditional likelihood ratio:
Kt,t+1(st+1) =
pˆi(st, st+1)
pi(st, st+1)
.
Hence, the parameter θ can be interpreted as the Lagrange multiplier for the belief distortion
of agents.
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The main implication of this proposition is that Kt,t+1(st+1)Mt,t+1(st+1) is the actual
stochastic discount factor when agents have fear for model misspecification and their target
approximating model is Mt,t+1(st+1), given that conditional expectations of agents are com-
puted by using the transition probability distribution between states at periods t and t + 1
denoted by pi(st, st+1). In the absence of arbitrage, therefore, the nominal price at period t
of pure nominal discounted (riskless) bonds whose maturity is period t+n (denoted by P hn,t)
satisfies the following relation:
P hn,t = Et[Kt,t+1Mt,t+1P
h
n−1,t+1] (3.7)
for n = 1, 2, · · · , T and where P h0,t = 1 for all t.
In the same way as is done in the previous section, we define a new variable Ψht satisfying
the following relation:
Ψht+1 = Kt,t+1Ψ
h
t . (3.8)
By using this newly defined variable, we rewrite the no-arbitrage relation specified above as
follows:
P˜ hn,t = Et[Mt,t+1P˜
h
n−1,t+1] (3.9)
where P˜ hn,t denotes a deflated bond price of Pˆ
h
n,t under the risk-sensitive approach (deflated
by Φt).
Assumption 3.2 (Specification of the target approximating stochastic discount
factor) Suppose that a standard affine term-structure model holds in the absence of agents’
fear for model misspecification. In addition, the target stochastic discount factor is specified
as
Mt,t+1 = exp(−rt −
1
2
λ′tλt − λ
′
tt+1), (3.10)
while the dynamics of factors (denoted by Xt) are described by the following equation:
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + Σt. (3.11)
An implication of assumption 3.2 is that the market price of risk is not affected by the
presence of fear of model mis-specification. In fact, we need this assumption in order to
maintain the affine structure of the model with risk-sensitive approach. Given assumption
3.2, the logarithm of the bond price under the risk-sensitive approach is a linear function of
state variables:
phn,t = a¯n + b¯
′
nXt − ψ
h
t (3.12)
where ψht is the logarithm of Ψ
h
t and p
h
n,t is the logarithm of P
h
n,t.
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Proposition 3.2 (Characterization of the risk-sensitive factor) Suppose that assump-
tions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. In affine term-structure models with the risk sensitive approach de-
scribed above, the risk-sensitive factor evolves over time according to the following equation:
ψht+1 = ψ
h
t + (λ
′
tt+1)/θ −
1
2
(λ′tλt)/θ
2. (3.13)
In order to show that this proposition holds, we point out that, given the result of
proposition 3.1 together with assumption 3.2, the belief factor Kt,t+1(st+1) can be written as
Kt,t+1(st+1) =
exp(λ′tt+1/θ)∫
exp(λ′tt+1/θ)pi(st, st+1)dst+1
. (3.14)
Hence, taking logarithm to both sides of this equation leads to
logKt,t+1(st+1) = λ
′
tt+1/θ −
1
2
(λ′tλt)/θ
2 (3.15)
where the second term in the right hand side of this equation reflects the fact that t+1 is a
normal random variable. Substituting this equation into the law of motion for φt specified
above leads to the conclusion of proposition 3.2.
Proposition 3.3 (Impact of the risk-sensitive factor on excess returns) The market
price of risk in period t is given by
λt = λ0 + λ1Xt. (3.16)
Suppose that assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 hold. The logarithm of excess return can be written as
rx
(n)
t,t+1 = b¯
′
n−1Σ(λ0 + λ1Xt)−
1
2
b¯′nΣΣ
′b¯n + b¯
′
n−1Σt+1 − ψ
h
t+1 (3.17)
where c = 0.
The key message of this proposition is that excess returns of holding bonds are directly
affected by the risk-sensitive factor.
4 Observational Equivalence and Empirical Measures
of Bounded Rationality Factors: Stochastic Discount
Factor
The key theoretic result of this section is that the bounded rationality factor from the affine
model with rational inattention is observationally equivalent to that of the model with risk-
sensitive approach. In this section, we will incorporate this equivalence result into our empir-
ical works in order to estimate the size of rational inattention and the magnitude of agents’
fear for model misspecification by using actual U.S. data on yields.
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Before going further, we summarize our equivalence result between models with rational
inattention and risk-sensitive approaches. Specifically, to the extent which the approxi-
mating model in the risk sensitive approach is identical to the target model under rational
inattention, the risk-sensitive and rational inattention factors are the same: ψt = ψ
h
t .
Proposition 4.1 (Equivalence Result) Suppose that the approximating model in the risk
sensitive approach is identical to the target model under rational inattention. Given this
assumption, the risk-sensitive and rational inattention factors are the same:
ψt = ψ
h
t . (4.1)
As a result, up to the deflated bond prices, the two models have the same set of equilibrium
conditions for bond prices in each maturity. The key reason why we have this result is that,
when the approximating model in the risk sensitive approach is identical to the target model
under rational inattention, deflated bond prices in the two models (equation (3.9) of page
12 and equation (2.20) of page 9, respectively) are subject to the same stochastic discount
factor.
It would be now worthwhile to discuss the difference between rational inattention and
risk-sensitive approaches. In this regard, we note that the risk-sensitive approach delivers
the following equation:
ψht+1 = ψ
h
t + (λ
′
tt+1)/θ −
1
2
(λ′tλt)/θ
2. (4.2)
As noted in the previous section, the presence of rational inattention implies that its inat-
tention factor is conditionally linear in terms of shocks to state variables:
ψt+1 = ψt − (1− τt)λ
′
tt+1 − (1− τt)Et[mt,t+1] + τ
2
t σ
2
v/2 (4.3)
where τt = 1 - exp(−2κ) in the case of rational inattention and τt = σt(mt,t+1)
2/(σt(mt,t+1)
2+
σ2ν) in the case of signal extraction. Hence, while each of them contains a predictable com-
ponent, the size of the predictable component in inattention factor (denoted by ψt) depends
on the degree of rational inattention, while that of the risk-sensitive approach (denoted by
ψht ) relies on the shadow value of the relative entropy constraint.
In particular, we adopt a two-step approach to estimate the degree of rational inattention
and size of multiplier in the risk-sensitive approach. First, we construct an empirical measure
of bounded rationality factors. Second, each model’s law of motion for its bounded ratio-
nality factor is then used to estimate the magnitude of rational inattention or the degree of
fear for model mis-specification. Our empirical results indicate that substantial amounts of
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information capacity constraint and robustness for model misspecification are needed to ex-
plain the observed behavior of yields when we use affine term-structure models. In addition,
out-of-sample forecasts of our models indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality
can enhance an affine term-structure model’s capability to forecast yields.
In our estimation, we assume that a subset of yields are observed without measurement
errors as is done in Chen and Scott (1993) and Ang and Piazzesi (2003). Specifically, maturi-
ties of yields without measurement errors are one-month, six-month, one-year, and five-year,
while maturities of yields with measurement errors are three-month and three-year. In par-
ticular, this assumption facilitates our analysis to estimate models with rational inattention
constraints for the stochastic discount factor in the presence of time-varying intercept terms
that are correlated with lagged innovations to state variables.
Our data set for yields is the same as the one used in Piazzesi (2010), while it covers a
shorter period than the one used in Ang and Piazzesi (2003). Specifically, the sample covers
data on zero coupon bond yields of maturities 1, 3, 12, 36, and 60 from January 1964 to
December 2003. The bond yields (12, 36, 60 months) are from the Fama CRSP zero coupon
files, while the shorter maturity rates (1 and 3 months) are from the Fama CRSP Treasury Bill
files. All bond yields are continuously compounded. The observed macro variables in our data
set consist of the PCE inflation rate (PCEPI) and the civilian unemployment rate (UNRATE)
that can be downloaded from the FRED at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We rely on
observed macro variables without using the principal component analysis. In addition, since
agents are assumed to be not subject to the information-processing constraint for observing
macro variables, the information-processing constraint in our estimation is applied to only
yield data, not to macro data.5
Having described our data set, we will discuss our estimation procedure employed in
this section. We begin with the case where a group of yields can be observed without
measurement errors. Specifically, when we observe N yields, K1 is the number of yields
that are observed without measurement errors and K2 is the number of yields that are
observed with measurement errors where K1 + K2 = N . As well known in the literature, this
assumption is useful in making one-to-one correspondence between latent factors and some
observed yields. For example, when Y1t is the vector of yields that can be observed without
measurement errors, the affine term-structure model of rational inattention constraint for
future states implies that the set of yields without measurement errors can be written as Y1t
= A1 + B1Xt + C1ψt where Y1t contains yields whose maturities are six-month, one-year, and
5Ang and Pizzesi relied on the principal component analysis to obtain two macro latent factors: One is
associated with the aggregate price indices and the other covers some measures of aggregate real activities.
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five-year. The short-rate equation is rt = δ0 + δ1Xt + ψt. Combining these two equations,
the vector of yields without measurement errors (net of the short rate) can be written as
Y˜1t = A˜1 + B˜1Xt (4.4)
where Y˜1t = Y1t − C1rt, A˜1 = A1 − C1δ0, and B˜1 = B1 − C1δ1.
We now exploit the assumption that matrix B˜1 is invertible. The state vector Xt can
be expressed in terms of yields without measurement errors: Xt = B˜
−1
1 (Y˜1t − A˜1). Substi-
tuting this equation into the law of motion for the state vector, we can derive a VAR(1)
representation for Y1t as follows:
Y˜1t+1 = Aˆ1 + φˆY˜1t + B˜1Σt+1 (4.5)
where Aˆ1 and φˆ are defined as
Aˆ1 = (I − φˆ)A˜1 + B˜1c φˆ = B˜1φB˜
−1
1 . (4.6)
For the set of yields with measurement errors, three-month and three-year maturities bond
yield, we have the following representation:
Y˜2t = Aˆ2 + B˜2B˜
−1
1 Y˜1t + ηt (4.7)
where ηt is a vector of measurement errors, Aˆ2 and B˜2 are defined as
Aˆ2 = A˜2 − B˜2B˜
−1
1 A˜1 A˜2 = A2 − C1δ0 B˜2 = B2 − C2δ1. (4.8)
Given this representation, we adopt the consistent two-step approach suggested by Hamil-
ton andWu (2011): First, one can use either OLS or maximum likelihood estimation to obtain
estimates of the reduced-form parameters. Second, structural parameters are obtained by
using the minimum-chi-squared estimation. In this case, a chi-squared statistic measures
the distance between the estimates of the reduced-form parameters and the values implied
by the structural parameters, while it is minimized via numerical optimization. It is shown
in Hamilton and Wu (2011) that this two-step procedure is asymptotically equivalent to
ML estimation but greatly reduces the computational problems. Our estimates of structural
parameters are reported in the appendix.
In Figure 1, we plot the estimated bounded rationality factor in the upper left panel.
The other factors are contained in the rest of panels. In this figure, the data for only yields
(hereafter “Yields Only”) are used in the model’s estimation. In order to see the cyclical
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Figure 1: Estimated Bounded Rationality Factors
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Note: The upper left panel represents the bounded rationality factor for future states.
The other panels show the rest of factors.
Figure 2: Cyclical Behavior of the Bounded Rationality Factor
Note: The left panel represents the cyclical part of the bounded rationality factor for
future states and the right panel contains residuals of the regression.
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Figure 3: Factor Loadings
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Note: This figure depicts the factor loadings of yields. The solid line corresponds to
factor loadings of factor 1, the dashed line shows factor loadings of factor 2, and the
dotted line is the factor loadings of factor 3. The dash-dot line represents the factor
loadings of bounded rationality factor.
property of the bounded rationality factor, we have done a regression of this factor on inflation
and unemployment:
ψˆt = 0.0010 + 0.0166 pit − 0.0314 ut
(0.0001) (0.0014) (0.0022)
(4.9)
where ψˆt is our measure of the bounded rationality factor, pit denotes the inflation rate, and
ut is the unemployment rate. The estimates of coefficients are significant at the level of 0.01
and the adjusted R2 of this regression is 0.3370. Hence, our regression results imply that the
bounded rationality factor is affected by macro-economic conditions.
Figure 2 displays the cyclical behavior of our measure of the bounded rationality factor,
while NBER recession dates are shaded. The left panel represents the cyclical part of the
bounded rationality factor that can be constructed by using the regression shown above, and
the right panel contains residuals of the regression. Specifically, the cyclical part is defined
as the part of our measure that is explained by the aggregate inflation and unemployment
rate. In particular, we can see from this figure that our measure of the bounded rationality
factor tends to drop down rapidly during recent recessions.
Figure 3 depicts the factor loadings of yields on factors. The solid line corresponds to
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factor loadings of factor 1, the dashed line contains factor loadings of factor 2, and the
dotted line is the factor loadings of factor 3. The dash-dot line represents the factor loadings
of bounded rationality factor. Most of all, the solid line (factor 1) is almost flat over the
whole maturity horizon so that this factor can be interpreted as the level factor in our model.
The factor loadings of the bounded rationality factor (the dash-dot line) decline dramatically
and then remain flat to the long end of the yield curve. Although factor 3 looks like the
curvature factor in a reverse manner, this factor has larger effects on yields than the other
factors with more influences on bond yields of relatively long maturities. Moreover, factor 2
has significant impacts on yields whose maturities are lower than around two-year. In sum,
our model has less apparent distinction among conventional latent factors as level, slope, and
curvature factors than prototypical three-factor affine models.
One might wonder how much would be the required magnitude of rational inattention
when we want to match the actual data on yields by using our model. In order to address
this issue, we estimate the value of parameter τ by using the following conditional likelihood
of the inattention factor:
f(ψˆt+1|ψˆt, λˆt, τ) = −
1
2λˆ′tλˆt
||ψˆt+1 − ψˆt − (1− τ)(rt +
1
2
λˆ′tλˆt)− τ
2σ2v,t/2||
2 −
1
2
log(2pi) (4.10)
where λˆt is our measure of the market price of risk and f(ψˆt+1|ψˆt, λˆt, τ) denotes the con-
ditional log-likelihood of ψˆt+1 given values of ψˆt and λˆt. The estimated size of rational
inattention is defined as follows:
τ ∗ = argmax
τ
T−1∑
t=0
f(ψˆt+1|ψˆt, λˆt, τ). (4.11)
In Figure 4, we plot the likelihood function of ψˆt as a function of τ . In this figure,
we can find that the log-likelihood is maximized at a small value of (1 − τ) that is close
to zero (2.2×1e-5). However, a relatively large value of τ does not necessarily mean that
the magnitude of the capacity-constraint on information-processing is insignificant. In order
to understand this argument, it is useful to see the relationship between the size of τ and
the upper bound on the capacity of information processing as shown in the right panel. The
estimate of τ implies that κ = 7.7696, while the case of pure rational expectations corresponds
to τ = ∞.
We now move onto the discussion of what would be the value of multiplier when we want
to match the actual data on yields by using our model with risk-sensitive approach. In order
to address this issue, we estimate the value of parameter θ by using the following conditional
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Figure 4: Estimated Size of Rational Inattention
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Note: The left panel shows the relation between the degree of rational inattention (1 − τ)
and log-likelihood value. The right panel depicts the relation between the degree of rational
inattention (1− τ) and the information processing capacity κ (bits).
likelihood of the inattention factor:
f(ψˆht+1|ψˆ
h
t , λˆt, θ) = −
θ
2λˆ′tλˆt
||ψˆht+1 − ψˆ
h
t +
1
2
(λˆ′tλˆt)/θ
2||2 −
1
2
log(2pi) (4.12)
where f(ψˆht+1|ψˆ
h
t , λˆt, θ) denotes the conditional log-likelihood of ψˆ
h
t+1 given a value of ψˆ
h
t .
6
The estimate of multiplier is defined as follows:
θ∗ = argmax
θ
T−1∑
t=0
f(ψˆht+1|ψˆ
h
t , λˆt, θ). (4.13)
In Figure 5, we plot the likelihood function of ψht as a function of θ. In this figure,
we can find that the log-likelihood is maximized at θ = 23.5. In order to see how far our
model is away from the case of rational expectations, we note that the case of pure rational
expectations corresponds to θ = ∞.
In order to show the empirical performance of the model, we report (out-of-sample)
forecast errors that are obtained from the estimated model. Specifically, we use our estimated
model to forecast over the last 60 months (the out-of-sample) of our sample and record the
6Here, note that ψˆh
t
= ψˆt, because of the equivalence result described in Proposition 4.1.
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Figure 5: Estimate of Multiplier in Risk-Sensitive Approach
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Note: This figure shows the relation between the value of multiplier θ and log-likelihood
value. The likelihood value is maximized at θ = 23.5, while the case of pure rational
expectations corresponds to θ = ∞.
forecast error that is defined as the difference between forecast and actual values. The
forecast errors tend to rise as the length of forecasting time period has increased as shown
in Figure 6. The absolute size of each forecast error is less than 10−2 for each maturity
of yields. In addition, RMSEs of yields whose maturities are six-month, one-year, five-year
(without measurement errors), three-month, and five-year (with measurement errors) are
0.0093, 0.0101, 0.0090, 0.0059, and 0.0337, respectively. As a result, the forecasting power
of our model is remarkably good.7
5 An Affine Term Structure Model with Rational Inat-
tention for Current States
We will show that inattention factors can arise in the presence of rational inattention on
current states. We then move onto the discussion of their impacts on prices of bonds. An
important point of this section is that the inattention factors help explain the expected excess
7We also estimate the case in which macroeconomic variables such as PCE inflation rate and unemploy-
ment rate are included and find that estimation results for the size of rational inattention and the Lagrange
multiplier of model misspecification are similar with those shown in this section, which are contained in the
appendix.
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Figure 6: Prediction Errors (Out of Sample)
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Note: This figure displays (out-of-sample) forecast errors.
returns of long-term bonds, while they do not affect the current yield curve. We thus present
some sufficient conditions for the inattention factors to be identical to the hidden factors
emphasized in Duffee (2011).
In order to incorporate current information-tracking problems into the state vector of
affine-term structure models, we assume that both risk-neutral and risk-averse agents do not
have perfect information about the current realization of state variables because they are
subject to a sequence of information-processing constraints. In addition, risk-neutral agents
create the linear dynamics of factors under the risk-neutral measure and risk-averse agents
create the linear dynamics of factors under the physical measure. The linear dynamics of
factors under the physical measure corresponds to the data-generating process.
Assumption 5.1 (Factor dynamics under the risk-neutral measure) Risk-neutral
agents create the linear dynamics of factors under the risk-neutral measure. The law of
motion for the state vector Xt under the risk-neutral measure is
Xt = c
q + φqXt−1 + Σ
q
t (5.1)
where Xt represents the state vector (a n× 1 random vector) under the risk-neutral measure
and t follows a normal distribution N (0, I).
22
Assumption 5.2 (Factor dynamics under the physical measure) Risk-averse agents
create the linear dynamics of factors under the physical measure. The law of motion for the
state vector Xt under the physical measure is
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + Σt. (5.2)
The absence of arbitrage leads to tight connections between parameters in the two linear
evolution equations of Xt. For example, when the market price of risk is specified as
Σλt = λ0 + λ1Xt, (5.3)
we can obtain the following relations between parameters:
φq = φ− λ1 c
q = c− λ0. (5.4)
For this reason, although both risk-neutral and risk-averse agents do not have perfect infor-
mation about the current realization of state variables, we consider only risk-neutral agents’
information problems for updating their information sets in each period, given constraints
on their information-processing. In addition, the specification of the market price of risk in
these two equations is not identical to the one used in the previous section in order to make
our inattention factor comparable to Duffee’s hidden factor.
Assumption 5.3 (Decomposition of the state vector) The state vector (denoted by Xt)
consists of both target and rational-inattention state vectors: Xt = [F
′
t Fˆ
′
t ]
′ where Ft denotes
the vector of true factors and Fˆt is the vector of inattention factors. The law of motion for
true factors is given by
Ft = cF +G1Ft−1 + ˜t (5.5)
where ˜t follows a normal distribution N (0, I). The true factors included in Ft are not
affected by the vector of inattention factors Fˆt.
We point out that this decomposition of the whole state vector into the two distinct
groups of factors is prevalent in models with rational inattention, while it also facilitates the
analysis of the impact of the inattention factors on prices of bonds. The law of motion for true
state variables is represented by a linear dynamic system that is not affected by inattention
factors. In fact, state variables of agents are augmented by some random variables that are
not spanned by true state variables. Hence, the presence of information processing constraint
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generates an augmented linear dynamic system that includes both true and agents’ state
variables.
In order to get some insight about the role of inattention factors in yield curve, we begin
with a two-factor model and then move onto a generalized result. Following Sims (2011),
when agents want to obtain a process that is close to the target process (denoted by xt),
their optimization problem can be written as
max
ht,σ2t
E0[
∞∑
t=0
βt(−(xt − ht)
2 + λ log(
(φq11)
2σ2t−1 + σ
2
,x
σ2t
))] (5.6)
where β represents the time discount factor of risk-neutral agents, σ2,x is the variance of
innovations to the stochastic process {xt}∞t=0, and the state variable xt follows an AR(1)
process of the form:
xt = φ
q
11xt−1 + 
q
x,t. (5.7)
The amount of information updated at period t is expressed in terms of the ratio of the
variance of ht prior to the information update to the variance of ht after the information
update (= σ2t ) and λ measures the shadow value of information cost.
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The optimal solution for ht is ht = E[xt|It]. Given this optimal solution for ht, the
optimization problem turns out to be
max
σ2t
E0[
∞∑
t=0
βt(−σ2t + λ log(
(φq11)
2σ2t−1 + σ
2
,x
σ2t
))]. (5.8)
The solution of this problem is
λ−1 + σ−2t =
β(φq11)
2
(φq11)
2σ2t + σ
2
,x
. (5.9)
In order to derive a joint autoregressive representation of (xt, ht) by using the solution of
this problem, it is convenient to assume that agents observe a noisy signal zt = xt+υt for the
true state variable xt and υt represents the noise. In this case, the conditional expectation
of xt is E[xt|zt] = γzt where γ = σ2x/(σ
2
x + σ
2
υ). When the inattention factor ht is defined as
ht = E[xt|zt], we have ht = γ(xt + νt). The expectation error for the inattention factor can
be used to derive the following equation: ht = E[ht|It−1] + γ(xt − E[xt|It−1]) + γ νt. As a
result, the solution of this problem produces a joint autoregressive representation of (xt, ht):(
xt
ht
)
=
(
φq11 0
γφq11 (1− γ)φ
q
11
)(
xt−1
ht−1
)
+
(
1 γ
γ γ
)(
x,t
νt
)
. (5.10)
8The mutual information measures the reduction of uncertainty of X due to the knowledge of Y : I(X,Y )
= h(X) - h(X |Y ) where h(X) is computed at period t−1 information set and h(X |Y ) is computed at period t
information set. h(X |Y ) = 1
2
log((2pie)n|Σt|) and h(X) =
1
2
log((2pie)n|Mt|). Hence, the mutual information
is I(X,Y ) = 1
2
(log(|Σt|)− log(|Mt|)).
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Given a joint autoregressive representation of (xt, ht) under risk-neutral measure, a joint
autoregressive representation of (xt, ht) under the physical measure can be written as(
xt
ht
)
=
(
φ11 φ12
φ21 φ22
)(
xt−1
ht−1
)
+
(
1 0
γ γ
)(
x,t
νt
)
. (5.11)
The first-order condition for σ2t and the information-processing constraint allow us to
obtain the relation between the Lagrange multiplier and the upper bound on the capacity of
processing information. Specifically, the first-order condition leads to a non-linear equation
for σ2:
(σ2 + λ)(σ2(φq11)
2 + σ2,x) = λβ(φ
q
11)
2σ2. (5.12)
The substitution of the first-order condition into the information-processing constraint leads
to the following equation:
λ =
σ2
β(φq11)
2 exp(−κ)− 1
. (5.13)
Hence, we can solve these two equations to express the Lagrange multiplier and the variance of
the inattention factor in terms of the upper bound on the capacity of processing information.
As a result, in the case of a rational inattention problem for current states, the value of γ is
endogenously determined by solving equations (5.12) and (5.13) given a relation of σ2 = γ σ2x.
However, values of σ2x and σ
2
ν are exogenously set in the case of a signal extraction problem
for current states. In this case, the value of γ (= σ2x/(σ
2
x + σ
2
ν)) is exogenously determined.
We now impose no-arbitrage conditions in pricing bonds. In this case, the logarithms of
bond prices are affine in the state vector:
pn,t = a¯n + b¯
′
n
(
xt
ht
)
. (5.14)
The coefficients a¯n and b¯n follow the difference equations:
b¯′n+1 = b¯
′
nφ
q + b¯′1, a¯n+1 = a¯n + b¯
′
nc
q +
1
2
b¯′nΣΣ
′b¯n + a¯1 (5.15)
for n = 1, 2, · · · , T, and where φq and cq are defined as φq = φ− λ1 and c
q = c− λ0.
Assumption 5.4 (Irrelevance of inattention factor for the short-term nominal in-
terest rate) In the two-factor example described above, the short-term interest rate at period
t (denoted by rt) is not affected by ht. Hence, the short-term nominal interest rate can be
written as
rt = −a¯1 − b¯1,1xt (5.16)
where b¯1,1 denotes the first element of b¯1.
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It might be worthwhile to discuss the implication of this assumption. We can set a¯1 = 0 and
b¯1,1 = - 1 in the case of xt = rt as in the example of Duffee (2011). Assumption 5.4 then
implies that the short-term nominal interest rate is perfectly observable. However, in the case
of xt 6= rt, more assumptions should be added to this interpretation in order to rationalize
assumption 5.4. In this case, we might need to assume that the central bank’s feedback
rule requires the short-term nominal interest rate to respond to only perfectly observable
variables when the central bank sets its target on the short-term nominal interest rate.
Proposition 5.1 (Irrelevance of inattention factor for the current yield curve)
Suppose that assumptions 5.1 - 5.4 hold. Then, a change in ht does not affect the time-t
yields.
Given assumptions 5.1 - 5.4, the formula of factor loadings implies that the vector of
coefficients for the price at period t of bonds that mature at period t+m can be written as
b¯m =
(
b¯1,1(1− φ
q
11)
−1(1− (φq11)
m)
0
)
. (5.17)
Hence, all yields at period t are not affected by ht.
Proposition 5.2 (Impact of inattention factor for expected excess returns for
long-term bonds) Suppose that assumptions 5.1 - 5.4 hold. Then, a change in ht af-
fects expected excess returns for long-term bonds. Specifically, suppose that agents purchase
m-period bonds at period t and sell them at period t + 1. The excess return for holding
m-period bonds is then given by
Et[xr
(m)
t,t+1] = a¯m−1 − a¯m + a¯1 − crxt + chht (5.18)
where cr and ch can be defined as
cr = b¯1,1{(1− φ
q
11)
−1(1− (φq11)
m − (1− (φq11)
m−1)φ11) + 1} (5.19)
ch = b¯1,1(1− φ
q
11)
−1(1− (φq11)
m−1)φ12 (5.20)
The result of this proposition can be obtained by substituting the recursive formula of
factor loadings and the evolution equation of the state vector into the definition of the
expected excess returns. Given this proposition, a non-zero value of φ12 helps allow for the
possibility that the inattention factor affects the excess return of holding long-term bonds.
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Given assumptions 5.1 - 5.4, the inattention factor is comparable to the hidden factor defined
in Duffee (2011). The reason behind this argument is that a snapshot of the time-t yield
curve conveys no information about the inattention factor. In fact, Duffee (2011) argues
that a hidden factor has opposite effects on expected future interest rates and bond risk
premia. For example, news that increases risk premia and simultaneously leads investors to
believe the central bank will soon lower short-term interest rates. The rise in risk premia
raises long-term bond yields immediately, while the expected drop in short rates induces an
immediate decrease in these yields. As a result, our analysis opens the possibility that a
hidden factor can arise endogenously when agents are subject to rational inattention.
We now move onto a general case in which there are more than two factors in order to spell
out a general version of sufficient conditions for the presence of bounded rationality factors.
In general, the behavior of the state vector Xt under the physical measure is described in a
compact form as a first-order Gaussian VAR:
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + Σt (5.21)
where t follows a normal distribution N (0, I). The law of motion for the state vector Xt
under the equivalent measure is then given by
Xt = c
q + φqXt−1 + Σ
qt. (5.22)
In particular, when the market price of risk is specified as
Σλt = λ0 + λ1Xt, (5.23)
there is a one-to-one relation between parameters in the evolution equation of Xt:
φq = φ− λ1 c
q = c− λ0. (5.24)
The presence of information constraint under the equivalent measure implies that matrix φq
is block-triangular
φq =
(
φq11 0
φq21 φ
q
22
)
(5.25)
It is also possible to partition the matrix in the market price of risk as follows:
λ1 =
(
λ11,1 λ12,1
λ21,1 λ22,1
)
(5.26)
In this case, the matrix φ under the physical measure is given by
φ =
(
φq11 + λ11,1 λ12,1
φq21 + λ21,1 φ
q
22 + λ22,1
)
(5.27)
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Hence, the presence of hidden factors requires that some elements of sub-matrix λ12,1 are not
zero. The reason for this result is that some non-zero elements of sub-matrix λ12,1 guarantee
a non-zero sub-matrix φ12.
We now show how we can satisfy these sufficient conditions in the presence of rational
inattention. For a moment, we assume that the law of motion for factors under rational
expectation (= Ft) is given by
Ft = cF + G1Ft−1 + ˜t. (5.28)
Based on the solution to the linear-quadratic optimization problem included in appendix A,
when Fˆt denotes the resulting rational-inattention factors, the law of motion for this set of
inattention factors can be written as
Fˆt = cˆF + (I − Σ˜Λ
−1)G1Ft−1 + Σ˜Λ
−1G1Fˆt−1 + Σ˜Λ
−1˜t + Σ˜Λ
−1ˆt. (5.29)
As a result, the whole state vector that consists of both true and rational-inattention state
vectors (Xt = [F
′
t Fˆ
′
t ]
′) turns out to be
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + Σt, t =
(
˜t
ˆt
)
(5.30)
where matrices φ, Σ and vector c are defined as
φ =
(
G1 0
(I − Σ˜Λ−1)G1 Σ˜Λ−1G1
)
Σ =
(
I 0
Σ˜Λ−1 Σ˜Λ−1
)
c =
(
cF
cˆF
)
(5.31)
In addition, Σ˜ is the covariance matrix of inattention factors and Λ is the covariance matrix
of the shocks to information set under rational inattention denoted by ˆ. Our result can be
then summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3 (Sufficient conditions for inattention factors to be hidden fac-
tors) Suppose that the short-term nominal interest rate is not affected by inattention factors:
rt = −a¯1 − b¯
′
1,FFt (5.32)
where b¯1,F is a sub-vector of b¯1 that is relevant for Ft. In addition, the state vector consists
of both true and rational-inattention state vectors (Xt = [F
′
t Fˆ
′
t ]
′):
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + Σt, t =
(
˜t
ˆt
)
(5.33)
where matrices φ and Σ are defined as
φ =
(
G1 0
(I − Σ˜Λ−1)G1 Σ˜Λ−1G1
)
Σ =
(
I 0
Σ˜Λ−1 Σ˜Λ−1
)
(5.34)
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Figure 7: Inattention Factor versus Hidden Factor
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Note : The solid line shows the estimated rational inattention factor for current states.
The dashed line depicts the fifth factor of Duffee (2011) that is estimated by using the
Kalman filter.
In this case, inattention factors included in Fˆt can be interpreted as hidden factors that
are defined in Duffee (2011). The optimization problem for the generalized specification of
inattention factor is included in the appendix.
In order to estimate the model with the rational inattention for current states, we assume
that the first latent factor is subject to the rational inattention constraint. The coefficient
of the inattention factor in the short-rate equation is set to be zero, which is a sufficient
condition adopted in Duffee (2011). In addition, we assume that all yields are subject to
measurement errors, so that we use the Kalman filter to estimate our model.9
As shown in Figure 7, both inattention and hidden factors tend to co-move over the
sample period, while different identification conditions are used for the two factors. Each of
these factors appears to have a long swing over the whole sample period. For example, the
two factors rise in early 1980s and then move down before in 1985. In addition, these two
factors stay below their sample averages in early 2000s.
In order to check the cyclical property of the rational inattention factor for current states,
9The estimates of structural parameters and their standard errors are included in the appendix.
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we have done a regression of this factor on inflation and unemployment:
hˆt = −0.0001 + 0.0018 pit + 0.0005 ut
(0.0087× 10−3) (0.0965× 10−3) (0.1519× 10−3)
(5.35)
where hˆt is our measure of the hidden factor, pit denotes the inflation rate, and ut is the
unemployment rate. The estimates of coefficients are significant at the level of 0.01 and the
adjusted R2 of this regression is 0.4813. Hence, our regression results imply that the rational
inattention factor for current states is affected by macro-economic conditions.
We now turn to estimation results of excess-returns regressions. Given the assumption
that a single linear combination of states determines the compensation investors demand to
face fixed-income risk from period t to period t + 1, we construct the risk premium factor
and investigate how much this factor can explain actual excess returns of bonds, following
Duffee (2011). In particular, the risk premium factor can be written as
RPt = λ1(L)
′Xt (5.36)
where RPt denotes the risk premium factor and λ1(L) is the vector of coefficients of the level
factor in the market price of risk. In order to see the impact of this risk premium factor
on the excess return of bonds, we use a series of predictive regressions for excess returns of
bonds:
xrmt,t+1 = b0 + b1RPt + t,t+1 (5.37)
where orthogonality is imposed between the risk premium factor and the residual. The
adjusted R2 of these predictive regressions for bonds with maturities of 2, 3, and 4 months
are 0.1401, 0.0867, and 0.0251 respectively. We note that, although our regressions are
focused on short-term yields, our estimates of adjusted R2 for bonds with maturities of 2-
and 3-month are higher than those reported in Duffee (2011). For example, Duffee (2011)’s
report on adjusted R2 is 0.048 from predictive regressions of excess monthly returns to five-
year zero-coupon bonds when the risk premium factor is constructed by using a multi-factor
model.
6 Conclusion
We have incorporated rational inattention and robustness for model misspecification into
macro-finance affine models in order to investigate the role of bounded rationality factor. Our
empirical results indicate that substantial amounts of information capacity constraint and
robustness preference for model misspecification are needed to explain the observed behavior
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of yields when we use affine term-structure models. Moreover, out-of-sample forecasts of
our models indicate that the incorporation of bounded rationality can enhance an affine
term-structure model’s capability to forecast yields. We also have evaluated the empirical
performance of our approach in terms of the role of bounded rationality factors to help
explain excess returns of bond holdings.
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Appendix
A Parameter Estimates on Future States
A.1 Estimation Method
The dynamics of factors (denoted by Xt) are described by the following state equation:
Xt = c+ φXt−1 + Σt. (A.1)
The set of yields without measurement errors has the following representation:
Y1t = A1 +B1Xt + C1ψt (A.2)
and the short rate satisfies the following equation:
rt = δ0 + δ1Xt + ψt. (A.3)
To eliminate ψt from these equations, we subtract rt from measurement equations of Y1t:
Y˜1t = A˜1 + B˜1Xt (A.4)
where Y˜1t = Y1t−C1rt, A˜1 = A1−C1δ0, and B˜1 = B1−C1δ1. By substituting this equation
into the law of motion for Xt, we can derive a VAR(1) representation for yield factor Y1t as
follows:
Y˜1t+1 = Aˆ1 + φˆ1Y˜1t + ut+1 (A.5)
where Aˆ1, φˆ1 and ut+1 are defined as
φˆ1 = B˜1φB˜
−1
1 , Aˆ1 = (I − φˆ1)A˜1 + B˜1c, Ω
(
≡ var(ut+1)
)
= B˜1ΣΣ
′B˜′1. (A.6)
In addition, as it was discussed in section 4, the bond yields with measurement errors can
be described as follows:
Y˜2t = Aˆ2 + φˆ2Y˜1t + ηt, (A.7)
where ηt is a vector of measurement errors, Aˆ2 and B˜2 are defined as
Aˆ2 = A˜2 − B˜2B˜
−1
1 A˜1, φˆ2 = B˜2B˜
−1
1 , A˜2 = A2 − C1δ0, B˜2 = B2 − C2δ1. (A.8)
By OLS estimation, we can obtain estimates of reduced-form parameters such as φˆ1, Aˆ1,
φˆ2, and Aˆ2. Since the number of reduced-form parameters are larger than that of structural
parameters in equations (A.6) and (A.8), we estimate φ, Σ, λ0, and λ1 by using the Minimum
Chi-Square Estimation (MCSE) as suggested in Hamilton and Wu (2011):
min
φ,Σ,λ0,λ1
[
||Aˆ1,OLS − (I − φˆ1)A˜1 − B˜1c||
2 + ||φˆ1,OLS − B˜1φB˜
−1
1 ||
2
+||Aˆ2,OLS − A˜2 + B˜2B˜
−1
1 A˜1||
2 + ||φˆ2,OLS − B˜2B˜
−1
1 ||
2
]
(A.9)
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Table 1: Estimates of Parameters (Inattention for Future States)
φ 0.8617 0 0
(0.3647)
0.2730 0.9553 0
(0.1611) (0.1555)
0.0773 0.2749 0.9337
(0.1481) (0.1289) (0.1673)
Σ 0.0013 0 0
(10−4 × 0.9891)
0 0.0004 0
(10−4 × 0.2083)
0 0 0.0006
(10−4 × 0.1766)
λ′0 0.4039 0.0284 0.4509
(0.2431 (0.1599 (0.4430
× 10−7) × 10−7) × 10−7)
λ1 0.0536 0 0
(0.0027)
0.4203 0.0247 0
(0.0014) (0.0019)
0.3985 0.3553 0.4532
(0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
B Parameter Estimation on Current States
Since we assume that bond yields of all maturities have measurement errors, we follow Duffee
(2011)’s estimation method. Specifically, we employs the Kalman filter to extract unobserved
factors. In this case, the transition equation of factor Xt can be written as follows:
Xt+1 = c+ φXt + Σt+1. (B.1)
In addition, the rational inattention factor ht is not eliminated but added to the three factors
of Xt: (
Xt
ht
)
= φq
(
Xt−1
ht−1
)
+ Σ
(
X,t
νt
)
. (B.2)
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where φq =


φq11 0 0 0
φq21 φ
q
22 0 0
φq31 φ
q
32 φ
q
33 0
γφq11 0 0 (1− γ)φ
q
11

 and ΣΣ′ =


1 0 0 γ
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
γ 0 0 γ2(1 + σ2v)

.
In our estimation, the measurement equation includes three-month, one-year, three-year,
and five-year maturity bond yields: (Yt = [y3,t y12,t y36,t y60,t]
′), while the measurement
equation can be written as follows:
Yt = A+B
(
Xt−1
ht−1
)
. (B.3)
C Inattention Factors in the Model with Information-
Processing Constraint on Latent Factors
Following Sims (2011), we specify the general case of linear-quadratic control with informa-
tion cost as follows:
min
Xt,Fˆt,Σt
E0 sum
∞
t=0β
t(F ′tAFt + F
′
tBXt +X
′
tCXt + λHt) (C.1)
subject to
Ft+1 = G1Ft + ˜t+1 (C.2)
Ht =
1
2
(log |Mt| − log |Σ˜t|) (C.3)
Mt+1 = Ω +G1Σ˜tG
′
1 (C.4)
˜t|Fs, Xs, s < t ∼ N (0,Ω) (C.5)
Ft | It ∼ N (Fˆt, Σ˜t) (C.6)
{Xt, Xt−1, · · · } ⊂ It (C.7)
In order to solve this problem, we break down the original optimization problem into two
distinct optimization problems. The first one is a conventional linear-quadratic stochastic
control problem. We do this by rewriting the quadratic part of the original objective function
in terms of {Fˆt}∞t=0. We also rewrite the evolution equation of Ft in terms of Fˆt. The next
one is a deterministic optimization problem for information flow that helps determine the
optimal Σ˜t subject to the information processing constraint.
As discussed above, we solve a prototypical linear-quadratic control problem whose
quadratic loss is expressed in terms of the expected value of true state vector conditional
on the current information set. We choose a stochastic process to minimize its distance
from the expected value of true state vector conditional on the current information set. The
linear-quadratic problem is specified as
min
Xt,Fˆt
E0
∞∑
t=0
βt(Fˆ ′tAFˆt + Fˆ
′
tBXt +X
′
tCXt) (C.8)
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Table 2: Estimates of Parameters (Inattention for Current States)
φ 0.0842 0 0 1.0447
(0.2268 (0.1531
×10−3) ×10−3)
0.0272 0.0071 0 0
(0.2551 (0.2062
×10−3) ×10−3)
-0.2656 0.2786 0.4217 0
(0.3150 (0.2460 (0.1972
×10−3) ×10−3) ×10−3)
0.0841 0.5904 0.4845 0.0001
(0.2265 (0.2615 (0.2506 (0.0002
×10−3) ×10−3) ×10−3) ×10−3)
Σ 0.7188 0 0 0.6952
(10−5×0.0932) (10−5×0.0963)
0 1.0000 0
0 0 1.0000
0.6952 0 0 0.7182
(10−5×0.0963) (10−5×0.1060)
λ′0 0.0127 0.0185 0.0404 0.0041
(0.2057 (0.1992 (0.1746 (0.3002
×10−5) ×10−5) ×10−5) ×10−5)
λ1 0.0029 0 0 0
(0.2649
×10−5)
0.0075 0.0050 0 0
(0.2958 (0.1496
×10−5) ×10−5)
0.0033 -0.0025 0.0001 0
(0.2361 (0.2389 (0.2113
×10−5) ×10−5) ×10−5)
0.0058 0.0059 0.0048 0.0027
(0.2870 (0.2615 (0.2506 (0.2060
×10−5) ×10−5) ×10−5) ×10−5)
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subject to
Fˆt+1 = G1Fˆt + ˆt+1 (C.9)
ˆt = Fˆt − Ft +G1(Ft−1 − Fˆt−1) + ˜t (C.10)
where Fˆt is the expected value of true state vector conditional on the current information
set. As a result, when the law of motion for the factors under rational expectation (= Ft) is
Ft = G1Ft−1 + ˜t (C.11)
the dynamics of factors under rational inattention (= Fˆt) is(
Ft
Fˆt
)
= φ
(
Ft−1
Fˆt−1
)
+ Σ
(
˜t
ˆt
)
(C.12)
where matrices φ and Σ are defined as
φ =
(
G1 0
(I − Σ˜Λ−1)G1 Σ˜Λ−1G1
)
Σ =
(
I 0
Σ˜Λ−1 Σ˜Λ−1
)
. (C.13)
In addition, Σ˜ is the covariance matrix of inattention factors and Λ is the covariance matrix
of the shocks to information set under rational inattention denoted by ˆ.
Second, the resulting deterministic optimization problem for information flow turns out
to be
max
Σ˜t
∞∑
t=0
βt(−trace(Σ˜tA) + λHt) (C.14)
subject to
Ht =
1
2
(log |Mt| − log |Σ˜t|) (C.15)
Mt+1 = Ω +G1Σ˜tG
′
1 (C.16)
The first-order condition for Σ˜t is
A = βλG1M
−1
t+1G
′
1 − λΣ˜
−1
t (C.17)
We thus find a value of Σt by solving the following equation:
λ−1A = βG1(Ω +G1ΣtG
′
1)
−1G′1 − Σ
−1
t . (C.18)
We now discuss how to compute covariance matrices Σ˜ and Λ. Following Harvey and
Rossi (2004), we can write an updating equation for Σ˜t as follows:
Σ˜t+1 = Mt −Mt(Mt + Λt)
−1Mt (C.19)
where Mt is defined as
Mt = G1Σ˜tG
′
1 + Ω (C.20)
We now discuss how to compute Λ and Σ˜. The steady-state version of this updating equation
is
Σ˜ =M −M(M + Λ)−1M (C.21)
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The well-known solution to this equation is
Λ−1 = Σ˜−1 −M−1 (C.22)
Hence, once we compute the matrix Σ˜, it is possible to compute Λ andM by using equations
specified above. Given this fact, we now use the first-order condition to compute Σ˜. In
particular, following Luo and Young (2010), the first-order condition can be rewritten as
Σ˜−1 = (QΣ˜Q +Q0)
−1 −A/λ (C.23)
where Q and Q0 are defined as
Q = β−1/2(G′1)
−1G1 Q0 = β
−1(G′1)
−1ΩG−11 (C.24)
We then solve this equation for Σ˜ and then check if the difference between M and Σ˜ is
positive definite.
D Models with Macroeconomic Variables
This section constains estimation results of models with both yield data and macroeconomic
variables such as the PCE inflation rate and unemployment rate.
Figure 8: Estimated Size of Rational Inattention
1 2 3 4
x 10−5
−3.8948
−3.8948
−3.8948
−3.8947
−3.8947
−3.8947
−3.8947
−3.8947
−3.8946
−3.8946
x 104 Log−Likelihood
Degree of Inattention
Lo
g−
Li
ke
lih
oo
d 
×
 
1e
3
1 2 3 4
x 10−5
7.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
Si
ze
 o
f I
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
Ca
pa
cit
y 
(bi
ts)
Degree of Inattention
Information Processing Capacity
Note: The left panel shows the relation between the degree of rational inattention (1 − τ)
and log-likelihood value. The right panel depicts the relation between the degree of rational
inattention (1− τ) and the information processing capacity κ (bits).
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Figure 9: Estimate of Multiplier in Risk-Sensitive Approach
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Note: This figure shows the relation between the value of multiplier θ and log-likelihood
value. The likelihood value is maximized at θ = 20.2, while the case of pure rational
expectations corresponds to θ = ∞.
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